Contacts — Researchers & Key People
*Last Updated: April 12, 2026* People referenced across the wiki, organized by domain. Cross-linked to relevant articles. ---
Contacts — Researchers & Key People
Last Updated: April 12, 2026
People referenced across the wiki, organized by domain. Cross-linked to relevant articles.
EM Side-Channel Analysis Researchers
Attack & Analysis Research
| Name | Affiliation | Research Focus | Papers / Work |
|------|------------|----------------|---------------|
| Kaptanoglu et al. | (IEEE S&P 2025) | Multi-channel spatial EM analysis, MIMO probe arrays | 8–16 channel beamforming attack on ARM Cortex-M4, 12–18 dB SNR improvement |
| Lee et al. | CISPA Helmholtz Center | Microarchitectural EM state inference, RISC-V | EM-Probe: instruction tracing through chassis shielding at 15 cm |
| Moriyama & Satoh | NTT Social Informatics Labs | Transient EM emission analysis (TEMA) | TCHES 2025 — asynchronous leakage extraction, 2–6 GHz transients |
| Zhang et al. | (CCS 2025) | Vision Transformers for EM trace analysis | EMFormer — 99.2% key rank reduction, 50% fewer profiling traces |
| Bold et al. | ETH Zurich (Secure Hardware Lab) | Self-supervised & contrastive learning for SCA | CEML — 99% reduction in labeling effort (IEEE S&P 2026) |
| Kitazawa et al. | — | Active EM-SCA | Active EM impedance-based attacks (2026) |
| Park et al. | MIT CSAIL | AI accelerator EM attacks, model extraction | IEEE S&P 2026 — Edge TPU DNN extraction via EM, 94% weight accuracy |
| Kisser & Heyszl | — | Automotive MCU cross-domain EM attacks | TCHES 2026 — CAN transceiver EM leakage from adjacent ASIL-D domain |
| Ravi et al. | — | PQC side-channel analysis (comprehensive) | CHES 2025 — survey of 12 PQC implementations on Cortex-M7, NTT single-trace |
| Fritzmann et al. | — | RISC-V scalar-crypto extension EM analysis | USENIX Security 2025 — SiFive X280, sha512sum0 carry chain leakage |
| Jang et al. | — | EM-induced Rowhammer on MCU flash | IEEE S&P 2025 — STM32H7 bit flip, secure boot bypass |
| Oberhansl et al. | — | EM side-channel on embedded systems | Referenced in practical guide |
| Collins et al. | — | EM monitoring and detection | Referenced in practical guide |
PQC Implementation Security
| Name | Affiliation | Algorithm Target | Attack Type | Reference | |------|------------|-----------------|-------------|-----------| | Ravi et al. | — | Kyber-768 | Template attack (NTT decapsulation) | ~10K traces on Cortex-M4 | | Primas et al. | — | Kyber | SPA on rejection sampling | Early Kyber implementations | | Beckwith et al. | — | Kyber-768 | CPA on Decode function | 50K traces, STM32F415 (2023) | | Pessl & Prokop | — | Kyber (FPGA, masked) | EM template attack | 200K traces, Artix-7 FPGA (2021) | | D'Anvers et al. | — | Dilithium-3 | SPA on rejection sampling loop | ~5K traces, ARM Cortex-M3 (2022) | | Zhang et al. | — | Dilithium-3 | CPA on NTT (key generation) | 30K traces, Arduino Uno (2023) | | Hamburg et al. | — | Dilithium (1st-order masked) | Horizontal EM attack | 500K traces (2024) | | Bernstein et al. | — | SPHINCS+ / WOTS+ | SPA on hash chain length | Key generation inference (2020) | | Park & Lee | — | SPHINCS+-SHAKE256 | DPA on FORS tree traversal | 100K traces, FPGA (2023) | | Schwabe & Wiggers | — | SPHINCS+-128s | Remote timing attack | 10^7 signature queries (2022) | | Groot Bruinderink et al. | — | FALCON | Template attack on CDT sampler | 40K traces, Cortex-M4 (2022) | | Nguyen & Tibouchi | — | FALCON | Single fault injection | 100% success rate (2024) | | Pessl | — | FALCON (Intel SGX) | EM analysis on FFT | 15K traces (2023) |
Countermeasures & Formal Methods
| Name | Affiliation | Focus | Work | |------|------------|-------|------| | ETH Zurich Secure Hardware Lab | ETH Zurich, Switzerland | DL for SCA, PQC countermeasures | CEML contrastive learning (IEEE S&P 2026) | | CISPA Team (Lee et al.) | CISPA Helmholtz Center, Germany | Microarchitectural SCA, RISC-V | EM-Probe (USENIX Security 2026) | | Georgia Tech SSLab | Georgia Tech, USA | Active EM/fault injection, AI accelerators | EM-Sight precision fault injection (USENIX Security 2026) | | WPI Team | Worcester Polytechnic Institute, USA | Formal verification vs. EM leakage | ELMO: RTL-level EM formal verification tool (CAV 2025) | | NTT SIL Team (Moriyama & Satoh) | NTT Social Informatics Labs, Japan | Advanced signal processing | TEMA transient analysis (TCHES 2025) | | TU Graz IAIK | Graz University of Technology, Austria | Masking schemes, real-world attacks | 3rd-order attacks on masked Keccak/SHA-3 (CHES 2025) | | MIT CSAIL (Park et al.) | MIT, USA | AI/ML security, model extraction | Edge TPU model extraction via EM (IEEE S&P 2026) | | Intel (ISSCC 2026) | Intel Corporation, USA | On-chip active EM cancellation | 35 dB SNR reduction, 5% die area overhead |
SIGINT & RF Research Community
RF Fingerprinting / SEI
| Name / Team | Affiliation | Focus | Key Result | |------------|------------|-------|------------| | DeepSig / RadioML team | DeepSig Inc., USA | AMC benchmarks, RadioML datasets | RadioML 2016.10A, 2018.01A — industry-standard SEI benchmarks | | RadioML 2023 contributors | Distributed / open | RadioML 2023.01A expansion | 2.4M samples, 30 modulations, realistic channel impairments | | CORES initiative | 2025 consortium | Crowdsourced real-world RF dataset | 50+ TB, GPS/ADS-B/LoRa/5G/Starlink signals |
Space-Based SIGINT
| Name | Company | Role | Notable Work | |------|---------|------|-------------| | HawkEye 360 team | HawkEye 360, USA | Commercial space RF geolocation | 30+ satellite cluster, TDOA geolocation for maritime/IED detection | | Unseenlabs team | Unseenlabs (Breizh Reconnaissance Orbiter), France | Passive maritime RF SIGINT | BRO-17/20 constellation (Nov 2025), dark vessel detection |
Community & Open Source
| Name | Project | Role | Notes | |------|---------|------|-------| | tteck (deceased) | community-scripts.org | Founder & primary maintainer | Proxmox VE automation scripts — project continues in his memory; Ko-fi supports cancer research and hospice care | | Colin O'Flynn | NewAE Technology / ChipWhisperer | Founder | ChipWhisperer open-source hardware platform for SCA |
Key Figures Referenced in Standards
| Name / Body | Organization | Standard / Role | |------------|-------------|-----------------| | NIST PQC Team | NIST, USA | FIPS 203, 204, 205 — PQC standardization | | NSA TEMPEST Program | NSA, USA | NSTISSAM TEMPEST/1-92, TEMPEST/2-95 classification | | NATO AC/322 | NATO | SDIP-27 zone classification (Zone 0–2) | | ANSSI | ANSSI, France | ASCAD dataset — EM trace database for AES; PQC evaluation |
See Also
| Article | Relationship | |---------|-------------| | organizations.md | All companies, standards bodies, and research institutions | | em-sca-index.md | Full wiki index with cross-references | | em-sca-key-players-companies.md | EM-SCA company profiles with revenue and market position | | sigint-private-companies-em-intelligence.md | SIGINT defense contractor and commercial intelligence company profiles | | em-sca-2026-developments.md | 2026 research papers and key researcher contributions | | pqc-implementation-security-2026.md | Published PQC attacks — researchers and trace counts | | sigint-academic-research-overview.md | Academic SIGINT community, conferences, and journals |